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1. Introduction  
The issue of the animality of man is back on the philosophical and sociological agenda.  At the 
philosophical level, this results from the more thorough-going critique of anthropocentrism and 
humanism in contemporary thought.  At the sociological level, the re-emergence of the thematic of 
barbarism, on the one hand, and the emergence of the recognition of our ‘posthuman future’, on 
the other hand, has brought into question the centrality of the humanity of the human.   
 
I would like to consider four different but inter-related questions that circle around the issues of the 
subject, sexual difference and the difference between what has been called historically ‘man’ and 
animal before concluding with what could be called ‘the comatose woman’.  I will say a few things 
first about the emergence of the ‘non-concept’ of difference in contemporary thought and how it 
has been used to deconstruct the purported domination of the subject and the technological 
preformation of thought that flows from it.  My argument will be that this reading of philosophy, as 
Derrida points out, brings to the fore the question of what the German language calls Geschlecht; 
that is, the question or questions of species difference, of sexual difference, of ethnic or racial 
difference.  In sum, those differences that the subject of western metaphysics transcended, either 
non-dialectically or dialectically.  These differences have been described conventionally as 
belonging to the order of nature, which is a categorization that deconstruction rejects.  What might 
lie beyond nature and these ‘naturalised’ differences is a certain experience of an originary 
multiplicity of the world before its determination by subjectifying thought.  The question that the 
issue of sexual and species difference raises, however, is: How can we both deconstruct the 
subject and the spiritualist metaphysics that determine it, while not falling into a naturalism or 
biologism that still requires both critique and denunciation?  Is there not only a paradox, but a 
dangerous paradox in trying to think the multiple.  It is my argument that deconstruction can not 
really answer these question and that this fact necessitates a re-evaluation of the subject and 
points to the limitations of postmodern notions of difference.   
 
 
2. Metaphysics and the subject of the reflexion model 
I will turn briefly to the question of the subject.  The ‘non-concept’ of difference is a way-out of 
Greco-occidental metaphysics and its determination of being by the subject.  Its cogency, 
therefore, derives from a particular reading of Western metaphysics that Heidegger developed out 
of suggestions by Nietzsche.  According to Heidegger, modernity and the modern determination of 
being is under the sway of ‘being-there’ determined as subjectum and the concept of 
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representation as the ‘beingness’ of being as such.  The subjectum determines truth as certainty, 
which serves up beings for man’s disposal in a process that Heidegger describes as ‘machination’.  
Representation is the treatment of beings as beings for the subjectum and his ‘machination’.  For 
Heidegger, ‘the unity of these powers of machination founds a position of power for man.  That 
position is essentially violent’ (Heidegger, 1991: 180).  The connection between metaphysics, the 
subject and violence, therefore, is quite clear for Heidegger.  This connection, moreover, relegates 
nature in western metaphysics to the status of the violated or subjugated other of the subject.  
 
If ‘all violence is a violence of the concept’, then thought must lead back to an unmediated 
experience of the object or a certain step beyond the immanence of the concept (Derrida, 1978: 
140).  The temptation of immediacy, to which Levinas succumbs in his conception of the face and 
to which Serres succumbs in his philosophy of the five senses, is one Derrida wishes quite clearly 
to avoid.  This is not the case with the thought of exteriority, as that which exists beyond being and 
its determinations; that is, to the thought of the ‘infinitely other’.  This is an experience to which 
Derrida draws nearer without, however, leaving behind an appreciation that within the Greek logos 
there was also a certain experience of otherness that the modern idea of the subject occluded.  
For Derrida, the modern subject is a captive of the living presence, which reduces past and future 
presents to that of the living present.  ‘Only the alterity of past and future presents’, Derrida 
argues, ‘permits the absolute identity of the living present as the self-identity of non-self identity’ 
(Derrida, 1978: 132).  Presence, presence-to-hand (Vorhandenheit) and the priority of beings as 
tools for man and his ‘machination’ have their origin in the violence of the concept that seizes 
being, rather than letting Being be or experiencing pure exteriority beyond being itself; that is, a 
thought that thinks non-identity as such is a thought beyond the concept. 
 
The connection between the subject and representation is interiorised in the reflexion model of the 
subject typical of modernity.  The question that must be raised is whether the hegemony of the 
model necessitates a deconstruction of the concept of subjectivity, rather than its reconstruction 
on another terrain.  The elements of the model of reflexion that concerns us here centre on the 
auto-affective character of the model.  Within Husserlian phenomenology, the subject is 
characterised as a being that hears itself speak in a circle of pure auto-affection.  It is not only 
hearing, but both sight and breath that are implicated in the auto-affective circle of the occidental 
concept of the subject.  Immediacy is what counts and representation must capture the immediacy 
or else lose all representational validity.  The closeness of the subject to the materiality of its 
expressions guarantees their ‘ownness’.  The recuperation of the gaze that loses itself in its 
reflection validates the subject’s own self-hood.  The breath that emanates from the being of the 
subject expresses immaterially the soul of the being that exhales.  The Occidental theory of the 
subject eschews alterity and difference, according to Derrida, and values identity as recuperation 
and reconciliation without loss.   
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The history of western metaphysics, however, is not as clear as this would suggest.  As Manfred 
Frank has pointed out, it is not clear that the subject as self-consciousness was conceived as both 
immediate and without differentiation.  Indeed, it was conceived usually both as a mediated and 
‘virtually’ differentiated relationship to oneself (Frank, 1984: 300-301).  What Frank makes clear, 
moreover, is that reflection was conceived as a detour through otherness back to the self.  For 
Derrida, the notion of an ‘otherness’ that would be reflected back into the self would not be ‘other’; 
and the notion of a unity into which ‘otherness’ would return is untenable.  The unity of self-
consciousness is an ‘undecidable’ and self-consciousness becomes, therefore, an effect of a non-
concept of difference that attains a transcendental status.  Difference is, as Frank shows, the 
power of the negative that can never be recuperated; and as such bears comparison with Hegel’s 
notion of ‘autonomous negativity’.  Unlike Hegel, however, Derrida does not think there is a unity to 
which the self returns out of negativity as there is only the difference that produced the subject in 
the first instance (Frank, 1984: 357-358).  If the western idea of the subject is not as hostile to its 
internal otherness as deconstruction suggests, then the idea that this subject is also responsible 
for the eradication of external nature is also implausible.  Hence, critics of the enlightenment 
project from Adorno and Horkheimer to Gray and Mestrovic are mistaken. 
 
 
3. Sexual difference: man and woman 
The importance of the question of sexual difference lies in the challenge that it poses to the idea 
that the subject and conceptual thought neutralise nature and the realm of the natural.  Within the 
thought of Heidegger, according to Derrida, the notions of Geschlecht and Neutralität circle around 
the theme of particularity and its opposite, between a mere anthropology, as opposed to a 
fundamental ontology, of Dasein.  The tension between these two poles is a recurrent theme of 
contemporary feminism; namely, whether the universality of certain philosophemes does not 
contain a profound complicity with male sexuality.  More radically, the question that this further 
raises is whether human beings are fundamentally ‘sexed’ beings; and whether this characteristic 
pre-determines subjectivity in ways that western thought has not been able to comprehend.  If 
sexual difference pre-determines and pre-forms subjectivity, then what remnants of a cognitive 
and ethical approach to subjectivity can be retained?  If the principle of autonomy contains a 
masked pre-determination and pre-formation of subjectivity by male sexual being, then what forms 
of subjectivity remain after the unmasking.  If autonomy is complicit with domination, then female 
sexuality and other alternative sexualities emerge as ‘exit-points’ from Western thought.   
 
Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s thoughts on Dasein and Geschlecht deconstructs both 
Heidegger’s and, by implication, western metaphysics’ attempt to ‘neutralise’ Geschlecht.  For 
Heidegger, it is ‘sexual neutrality’ and not ‘sexual difference’ that is both required for the analysis 
of Dasein and even indicated by the passage from the masculine Mann to the neutral Dasein 
(Derrida, 1987: 400).  The separation of the anthropological realm of sex, gender, race and 
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species from that of fundamental ontology seems to repeat a typical gesture of Western 
philosophy that can be also seen in the difference between Kant’s Anthropologie and the Critique 
of Pure Practical Reason; namely, the gesture of simultaneous recognition and marginalisation of 
the anthropological domain.  What Derrida shows, however, is that Heidegger’s attempt to argue 
that sexual neutrality is a neutrality that refers only to sexual duality and that the neutrality of 
Dasein contains an ‘originary positivity (ursprüngliche Positivität)’ that does not result in a ‘de-
sexualisation’ of Dasein, but to a positive notion of a ‘pre-differential’ or ‘pre-dual’ sexuality that is 
neither ‘unitary’, ‘homogeneous’ or ‘undifferentiated’ (Derrida, 1987: 402).  ‘Pre-dual’ sexuality is 
an undecidable and the dualisation of sexual being emerges, therefore, as a negativity in the 
thought of Heidegger.  The implication for subjectivity is that selfhood or Selbstheit is already 
marked by sexuality before its subsequent dualisation and subsequent ‘violent’ neutralisation 
(Derrida, 1987: 404). 
 
This ‘pre-dual’ sexuality or non-originary sexual origin of being is ‘originary positivity’.  This 
‘originary positivity’ is ‘non-originary’ in so far as it is ‘the internal possibility of a dispersion or of a 
factual dissemination (faktische Zerstreuung) in the body proper (Leiblichkeit) and ‘by there in 
sexuality (und damit in die Geschlechtlichkeit)’ (Derrida, 1987: 405-6).  Factual dissemination 
belongs, therefore, to the neutral concept of Dasein.   It constitutes the ‘originary spatialisation’ of 
Dasein; and has a transcendental status in so far as elevates ‘dispersion’, ‘dissociation’ and ‘de-
liason’ into quasi-transcendentals.  ‘Transcendental dispersion’ is the pre-originary origin of the 
spatial determinants of Dasein in its neutral determination; and not merely, as it is usually viewed, 
as a mode of inauthenticity of Dasein (as in the analysis of Geworfenheit) (Derrida, 1987: 413).  
Derrida’s conclusion is that sexual difference as ‘transcendental dispersion’ is ‘not yet’ or ‘already 
more’ than sexual duality (Derrida, 1987: 414).  Sexual difference acquires, through this turning, a 
transcendental and undecidable aspect that renders simplistic any elevation of female sexual 
being over male sexual being, both of which acquire a derived character.  ‘Factual dissemination’ 
has a sexual character that is not yet ‘sexed’, but already more than ‘sexed’ in so far as its seminal 
character is multiple.  Sexual difference or duality, therefore, is a narrowing of an originary 
multiplicity.   
 
It is in the body or in bodiliness that this ‘factual dissemination’ is located not as either a male or 
female body, but as a sexed body or as the flesh prior to all sexual dualisation: ‘assigned to a 
body, Dasein is, in its facticity, separated, subservient to dispersion and to pacellisation 
(zersplittert) and by that very fact (ineins damit) always disunited, detuned, cloven, divided 
(zwiespältig) by sexuality, towards a determinant sex (in eine bestimmte Gechlechtlichkeit)’ 
(Derrida, 1987: 406).  Unlike feminist psychoanalysis that sees in the historico-cultural valorisation 
of the male sexed being, the beginnings of the western idea of the subject, Derrida outbids all 
psychoanalysis and all theories of subjectivity in his reading of Heidegger’s idea of the flesh.  The 
multiplicity that is flesh as the locus of ‘factual dissemination’ sexualises the body without sex and 
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subjectivises it without the subject.  It becomes the origin as originary dispersion and de-liason: a 
multiple origin.  Sexual difference, therefore, is more accurately understood as multiplicity. 
 
 
4. The animal rationale of western thought: man and animal 
The question of species difference arose out of atypical emanation of the sixties; namely, animal 
liberation is a product of the sixties.  At a time when peasants, workers, students, women and 
homosexuals amongst others demanded liberation from a society that was uniformly characterised 
as repressive or oppressive, animal liberation as well as ecological movements posed the 
question of a liberation not from a particular type of society, but of a particular mode of relation 
between society and nature.  This fetishism for liberation was not without the kind of difficulties 
satirized unmercifully by Alexei Sayle in a sketch which depicted the revolutionary liberation of a 
line of shopping trolleys from their chains outside a supermarket.  These movements, however, 
had an undeniable effect.  The initial main proponent of ‘animal liberation’, for example, used the 
utilitarian philosophical tradition to cut through discussions of the differences between man and 
animal in terms of the possession or non-possession of a soul or of a free will; and to assert that 
the sentient nature of animals required us to pursue a ‘utilitarian calculus’ both with respect to man 
and animals (Singer).  Such a calculus is, of course, not designed to produce a difference, but to 
eliminate one.  The difference to be eliminated is the western philosophical elevation of man over 
the animal through the elaboration of a species (Geschlecht) difference.  What is, as Marx would 
have put it, the species-being (Gattungswesen) of man?  Marx’s answer was thought and the 
imagination, as in the ‘parable’ of the architect and the bee, Heidegger’s answer is thought and the 
hand or, rather, a particular usage of the hand.   
 
For Heidegger, according to Derrida’s reading, it is the hand or, more particularly, a particular 
usage of the hand that separates human beings from animals such as monkeys.  The monkey is, 
of course, an animal that possesses a hand, but its usage of the hand is not that of Dasein.  The 
monkey uses its hand solely as a tool with which to grasp things; it is its prehensile grip that 
determines the use that it makes of its hand.   The human being as animale rationale is also an 
animal which seizes things; and, moreover, it is precisely this aspect of seizure which, as Derrida 
points out, Hegel associates with the concept.  It is, therefore, elsewhere that the difference 
between man and animals resides.  What Heidegger, in fact, uses to separate man from animal is 
the capacity of the hand to give and receive and not simply to seize; an opposition which Derrida 
deconstructs in terms both of his earlier analysis of the undecidable character of the pharmakon 
as both remedy and poison; and in terms of an analysis of Heidegger’s own concepts of presence-
at-hand (Vorhandenheit) and ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) (Derrida, 1987: 432). 
 
The hand holds a seminal importance in the work of Heidegger not only in terms of the gift, but 
also as a sign, a monstrance.  A monstrance is an archaic word with one of two meanings.  It 
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refers either to a demonstration or a proof or it is a receptacle on which the host sits (SOED).  
Derrida stresses the connections that Heidegger makes between the hand and thought, between 
thought and the word, and between the word and Handwerk; and stresses the hands of Heidegger 
himself and his insistence on handwriting and his repulsion, shared neither by Nietzsche nor 
Derrida, for the mechanical typewriter or the personal computer.  This series of metonymical shifts 
are part of Heidegger’s critique of technology, which at this level of the argument counterpoises 
the hand as receptacle to the hand as tool.  The hand as receptacle gives and receives; it is no 
longer a tool that seizes and makes useful. It is this concept of the hand that allows Heidegger to 
reverse the metaphysical determination of the hand as presence-at-hand by readiness-to-hand or 
usefulness.  For Heidegger, the primary character of pragma or things is precisely their presence-
at-hand, their present-ness.  
 
This argument will not, of course, escape Derrida’s critique of presence; a critique he pursues in 
terms of Heidegger’s rejection of mechanised writing as the ‘destruction of the word (Zerstörung 
des Wortes)’ (Derrida, 1987: 434).  The co-belonging of the hand and the word, the word and the 
handwork of handwriting also involves a link on Derrida’s reading, although Heidegger makes no 
such link directly, between the hand-written word and the phonetic system of writing.  The 
privileging of the hand as presence-at-hand also involves, therefore, a secret complicity with the 
phonē as immediate self-presence.  It is not, however, presented as such by Heidegger, but the 
elevation of Socrates to the rank of the purest thinker of the Occident because he did not write and 
his further identification of intellectual decline with the advent of literature suggest otherwise for 
Derrida.  As Heidegger sees it, according to Derrida’s reading, there is ‘an essential and originary 
co-belonging of Sein, Wort, legein, logos, Lese, Schrift as Handschrift.  This co-belonging which 
collects them together belongs moreover to the same movement of gathering which Heidegger 
reads ... in legein and in reading’ (Derrida, 1987: 436).  It is, moreover, the hand in the singular 
that concerns Heidegger as hands imply dispersal, rather than a gathering. 
 
This meditation on the hand as the way to designate the difference between man and animal is 
radicalised in Heidegger’s reading of the world in the posthumously published lecture series on the 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.  For Heidegger, man is weltbildend and the stone is 
weltlos, whereas in the middle stands the animal as weltarm.  For Derrida, these distinctions, 
despite their phenomenological sophistication, lead back to the old western metaphysical debate 
concerning whether animals possess or do not possess a soul or spirit.  In other words, they lead 
back to an unexplored opposition between the Platonic-Christian notion of spirit and its chthonic or 
pagan alternative: the spirit as flame as it appears in the poetry of Trakl.  For Heidegger, the world 
in this text is spirit and the world-forming capacities of Dasein are spiritual.  The problem, 
therefore, is what does the animal possess or not possess given that it is not without a world, but 
merely poor in relation to the world.  The example used by Derrida is Heidegger’s example of a 
lizard on a rock and his suggestion that one should ‘strike through’ the word rock in order to signify 
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what the animal lacks; namely the capacity to name the rock (Derrida, 1987b: 83).  This 
fundamental incapacity means that, as Derrida puts it, ‘one cannot say that the animal is closed to 
being.  It is closed to the very opening of being.  It has no access to the difference between open 
and closed’ (Derrida, 1987b: 85).  The interesting point here is that although Derrida 
acknowledges that this distinction smacks of anthropocentric or humanist teleology; that is, the 
incapacity to name closes off animal being to the very notion of being as the difference between 
openness and closedness, Derrida argues that this was justified, then as now, as the price to be 
payed ‘in the ethico-political denunciation of biologism, of racism, of naturalism, etc’ (Derrida, 
1987b: 87). The lapse into humanism by Heidegger, which threatens to undo his deconstruction of 
the Platonic-Christian metaphysical tradition, receives a contextual justification from Derrida that 
will be shown to be out of line with the general determination of the concept of spirit as flame in 
Heidegger. 
 
This argument does not seem plausible, however, if we think more in terms of the 
phenomenological concept of the world than in terms of the political conjuncture.  What Heidegger 
will later call ‘earth’ has nothing at all to do with the phenomenological concept of the world’ as the 
horizon of human activity.  The concept of earth is chthonic, that of world is gnostic or 
intellectualist.  Hence, the early Heidegger’s commitment to the concept of the world seems a 
more promising avenue of inquiry than the later Heidegger’s notion of the Geviert; and Derrida’s 
accusation of humanism merely stifles the further development of this argument.  Furthermore, if 
the deconstruction of the notion of spirit in western metaphysics must stop before it collapses into 
biologism, racism and naturalism, then the question of the plausibility of the man and animal 
question must be taken more seriously and not short-circuited by accusations of humanism.  
Finally, there is a sense in which the Derridean deconstruction of spirit parallels a kind of deep 
ecological position in which the ‘human being is not a thing in an environment, but a juncture in a 
relational system without determined boundaries in time and space’ (Naess, 1989: 79).  Unlike the 
anthropocentrism of the utilitarian calculus of ‘animal liberation’, deep ecology departs from the 
standpoint of both ‘holism’ and ‘antihumanism’; a standpoint sympathetic to the anti-Cartesian 
sensibilities of Heideggerians (Ferry, 1992: 144). As Ferry points out, however, such a position 
can only lead to the positing of a concept of life as the overarching value (Ferry, 1992: 171).  
There is no sign in Derrida’s thoughts on messianism that such a limited notion is adopted, but if 
this is the case then the anti-humanism is not as radical as suggested and the question of the 
world-forming character of man is more legitimate than Derrida allows. 
 
The sexual difference and the species difference cannot be deconstructed by recourse to a pre-
originary origin of sex that pre-exists the emergence of dual sexes or the common value of life that 
subtends both human and animal life.  The thought of difference strikes real difficulties in so far as 
its anti-humanist drift can not fully cover over the question of subjectivity.  The accusation of 
naturalism or biologism, of either a chthonic or intellectualist kind, awaits every over-drawn 
 9
deconstruction of subjectivity.  The attempt at a ‘subjectivity without any subject’ is an attempt to 
address this problem (Blanchot, 1986: 30); as is the attempt at a ‘messianism without the 
messianic’ in Derrida’s politics.  The extent to which it is a philosophical project that can be 
successfully executed remains, however, to be explored. 
 
5. The open: the animal and the comatose woman 
The recent work of Giorgo Agamben (2002) has thrown an unusual light on the Heideggerian 
theory of the animal by pointing to the influence on it of the zoologist Jacob von Uexküll.  Uexkull 
made a distinction between Umgebung, which is the objective space within which humans 
supposedly move, and the Umwelt, which is constituted by ‘bearers of signification’ 
(Bedeutungstraeger) or of ‘marks’ or ‘markings’ (Merkmaltraeger).  The animal, for Uexküll, is only 
interested in those ‘bearers of signification’ that constitute its environment.  The animal knows 
nothing about the object as ‘no animal enters into a relation with an object as such’, but only with 
those ‘bearers of signification’ that constitute its Umwelt (62).  Hence, the spider does not know 
the fly that it entraps, but ‘the web characterizes the paradoxical coincidence of this reciprocal 
blindness’ (67).  It is the blindness toward the object that creates an openness through the 
separate but complementary closure of each animal’s Umwelt.  For Agamben, this idea breaks out 
of the unitary universe of classical science and partakes of the revolutionary ideas of quantum 
physics and the avant-garde.  And it is precisely this revolution that is expressed in Heidegger’s 
redefinition of the subject as Dasein in relation to its world as one of in-der-Welt-sein. In other 
words, the subject does not confront an object-world, but the world constitutes an enclosure that is 
Dasein’s originary form of openness.  
 
For Agamben, the distinction between the stone, the animal and man is really a way of thinking 
through what difference the irruption of man into the living means in relation to the animal beyond 
the conventional designation of man as an animal rationale within the context of that 
‘anthropological machine’ that determines Western subject (75).  In this context, he points to two 
radically different solutions in the Heideggerian oeuvre.  In the Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, Heidegger translates von Uexküll’s concepts into his own and argues that the 
fundamental mode of being of the animal as one of stupeur or captivation or Benommenheit.  
Hence, the animal is distinguished from its other in terms of the etymological chain that stems from 
benommen (captivate/benumb) to eingenommen (absorb) to Benehmen (behaviour), and as such 
it is absorbed by its ‘bearers of significance’, whereas the etymological chain that determines its 
other leads from handeln (act) to sich verhalten (comport oneself).  This would seem to determine 
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the issue along the lines of a distinction between, to put it simply, behaviour and action or the ‘être-
pris’ and the ispeite or Selbstheit of man’ (79).  But there is more to it than that as Heidegger is 
arguing that the animal possesses a world; it is weltarm not weltlos. Stupeur or captivation is the 
soustraction (Genommenheit) through which the animal can be re-absorbed by the world 
(Hingenommenheit).  It is its specific form of openness or closure in so far as the animal’s ‘bearers 
of signification’ make a world open to it if not accessible or revealed (offenbar).  Captivation cracks 
open that world that constitutes the animal. 
 
According to Agamben, there is a radicalisation of the openness that the animal effects in the 
reading of the animal that Heidegger gives some ten years later.  This radicalisation can be best 
seen in the reference to Rilke who argues that it is the animal (die Kreatur) which sees the 
opening, whereas man has his eyes inverted and placed like traps within his interior (87).  The 
animal experiences the opening, but not the revelation, through its stupeur or captivation.  But 
what precisely is the more fundamental?  As Agamben puts it, ‘la stupeur est une ouverture plus 
intense et fascinante que toute connaissance humanine; de l’autre, en tant qu’il n’est pas en 
mesurer de devoiler son proper desinhibiteur, il est ferme dans une complete opacite’ (90).  
Hence, the animal’s stupeur or captivation corresponds to the opposition between negative 
theology and positive theology; or ‘the obscure night of the mystic and clarity of rational 
knowledge’, or, finally, mystical knowledge and destructive observation (90-1).  Its stupeur or 
captivation entails, in other words, ‘an expulsion towards the other than it’ which qua desinhibiteur 
introduces an essential shattering or cracking open to otherness of the animal (wesenhafte 
Ershuetterung) (93).  The animal is, in Agamben’s words, ‘tendu extatiquement hors de soi dans 
une exposition qui l’ebranle dans toute sa constitution’ (94).  Through an extended analysis of 
boredom, Heidegger reoperates the distinction between man and animal and concludes, 
according to Agamben, that ‘le Dasein est simplement un animal qui a appris a s’ennuyer, qui 
s’est reveille de sa propre stupeur et a sa propre stupeur’ (107).  Man or humanity is the 
awakened animal; awakened to the captivation that constitutes him or it through boredom. 
 
For Agemben, Heidegger’s politics is read in the light of this interpretation of the animal. The early 
Heidegger’s opposition between openness and revelation is embedded in his interpretation of the 
conflict (Streit) internal to the polis over concealment and unconcealment and the prospect of an 
assumption by a people of its destiny.  It remains true to the anthropological machine, whereas his 
later work gives up the possibility of a grand shattering (Ershuetterung).  Agamben’s solution to 
this predicament is to revert to the category of ‘vie nue’ and to argue that the only thing left is ‘la 
‘gestion integrale’ de la vie biologique, c’est-a-dire de l’animaliaet meme de l’homme’ (117).  It 
seems to me a somewhat short-circuited alternative to argue that political theory can only circle 
around either the exhausted thematic of post-histoire or the quasi-naturalised terrain of the 
genome, the global economy and humanitarian ideology’ (117).  It is a perspective haunted by the 
biopolitics of the camps as the nomos of the modern where the new living dead man is born, 
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whether that be the concentration camp prisoner, the refugee, neomort or the comatose.  Political 
modernity is construed as quasi-totaliatarian in its continued manufacture of a zone of exclusion 
where the state of exception is decided in the confrontation between sovereign power and bare 
life. 
 
The animalisation of the human and the humanisation of the animal remains nevertheless a 
pressing thematic.  At another point in his text, Agamben refers to a famous painting of Titien that 
renders a scene of sexual satisfaction which he interprets not as a return to nature, but as a mode 
of boredom, of idleness or otium, of destitution or desoeuvrement.  This is the fundamental 
Stimmung or attunement of the animal’s opening that is still present or revealed in sexual satiety, 
according to both Benjamin and Agamben.  At yet another point, he refers to the Jew, the neomort 
and the coma patient as figures of animality isolated in the human body itself.  The neomort and 
the coma patient are key figures as well in the films of Almodovar.  In Talk to Her the film’s pivotal 
scene is not filmed, but neither is the act staged in Titien’s painting except by reference to the goat 
or stag in its background.  The idleness and desouevrement that Titien depicts post coitum is now 
a pornographic cliché.  In the nakedness of the female coma patient, the body regains the erotic 
charge it lost when it became the nude; and around the non-presented sexual act circles the 
endless attempts to humanise the wesentliche Erschuetterung that expels the animal towards 
being. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
What we can conclude, perhaps, is that the denunciation of the concept and the subject as a form 
of violence is a one-sided characterisation of the history of western thought and the contemporary 
project of the enlightenment.  We can further say that the deconstruction of subjectivity through 
sexual difference results in a notion of the flesh as a locus of ‘factual dissemination’ prior to the 
emergence of sexual dualisation and that the deconstruction of subjectivity through species 
difference results in a notion of the hand as a receptacle of being prior to any utilitarian 
determination.  Both deconstructions, however, escape the subject not by any simple privileging of 
female sexuality or animal experience.  Nor do these deconstructions escape the subject in so far 
as they in fact turn into a meditation on the flesh or the hand.  There is a certain reference to 
humanity that survives these deconstructions and must do so if a crude naturalism is to be 
avoided.  After all, what deconstruction is after is the transcendental non-site out of which 
difference emerges, as either sexual or species difference.  The question of the subject is pushed 
back and altered, but not liquidated by this manoeuvre.  If this were not the case, then the ethico-
political denunciation of biologism, of racism, of naturalism would indeed be impossible. The 
refugee does not become a figure of ethical concern merely by an act of sovereign power, and the 
critique of humanitarianism complicity with bare life is well taken (133).  Nevertheless, the political 
construct of nativity and nationality that creates the refugee is only one of the elements that 
constitutes our political modernity even if it has led to the most gruesome of consequences.  What 
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we have tried to reconstruct here is the attempt to think multiplicity through the concept of 
Geschlecht.  This would be an originary multiplicity that pre-exists the determination of nature by 
the subject and dualistic thinking. We have also looked at the opening that precedes the distinction 
between animal and man that expels both ‘outside of being’.  The animal creates an essential 
breach or cracking open of a world, and humanity is determined, or as I have argued even overly 
determined, in relation to this breach.  Life as an overarching value leads interestingly if somewhat 
problematically to the fixation of the ethical relation on the management of its limit, viz. bare life, as 
opposed to the good life of the western philosophical tradition. 
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